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Natalie Winters drops the exclusive: a leaked internal Committee of 100 report exposes how a CCP-linked influence group spent tens of thousands (dollars) flying elite journalists and editors on carefully managed “opinion leader” trips to China from
The New York Times
Washington Post
Politico
The New Yorker
The Atlantic
NPR
PBS
Newsweek
Time
Foreign Affairs
USA Today
Financial Times
and more…
Organizers privately celebrated the results…
70% of participants returned with improved views of Beijing, new story ideas, and plans to reshape coverage.
One Financial Times editor vowed he’d never write about China the same way again.
A WNYC host said his perception changed “in 100 ways.”
This video presents names, costs, itineraries, and the paper trail.
This isn’t ancient history - it’s the propaganda pipeline that helped shape how Americans understood Communist China for years.
What should happen to journalists who took the trips and then soft-pedaled the CCP?
Drop your take below…
Our Notes
What is the current relationship between China and the U.S.A, and how did it come to be? (Grok)
The current US-China relationship (as of late July 2026) is one of managed strategic competition mixed with pragmatic engagement and efforts at “constructive strategic stability,” driven heavily by leader-level diplomacy between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
It is competitive and tense in technology, security, and some trade areas, but more stable and deal-oriented than the sharper confrontations of recent years, with a reduced risk of uncontrolled escalation in the near term. [ncafp.org]
Key features include:
Multiple high-level summits planned or held in 2026 (Trump’s state visit to Beijing in mid-May 2026; Xi expected in the US in September; possibly more). Leaders have described a constructive relationship of strategic stability and referenced a “G2”-style dynamic of competitive coexistence. [gisreportsonline.com]
Economic ties remain large and interdependent. There have been deals on agricultural purchases, Boeing aircraft, and mechanisms like proposed Boards of Trade and Investment. A tariff truce from late 2025 has kept rates managed, with recent Section 301 actions adding ~10–12.5% on many goods for forced-labor concerns, and overall levels remaining within previously negotiated bounds of around or below 20% additional in key categories, rather than the extreme peaks of 2025.live-streamed Tech restrictions continue (semiconductors, AI, robots), with occasional easing or targeted sales (e.g., certain Nvidia chips). [reuters.com]
Security flashpoints persist: Taiwan (arms sales remain sensitive; Trump has treated them partly as leverage), the South China Sea, military deployments/posturing, cyber issues, and China’s ties with Russia/Iran. Military-to-military and crisis-management channels are being rebuilt. Cooperation exists or is sought on fentanyl, AI safety, and some other transnational issues.
Rhetoric from the Trump administration has been more conciliatory and deal-focused than pure “strategic competition” framing, though underlying rivalry continues and risks of miscalculation remain. Both sides appear focused on stability through the rest of 2026 (and domestic political calendars). [globalaffairs.org]
Overall, it is neither full decoupling nor partnership - it is competitive coexistence with guardrails, personal diplomacy, and economic pragmatism.
How it developed
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, US-China relations have gone through distinct phases:
1949–early 1970s (hostility/containment): After the Communist victory, the US recognized the Republic of China (Taiwan) and opposed the PRC. The Korean War (1950–53) saw direct combat. Relations were frozen amid Cold War ideology, with US containment policy and no formal diplomatic ties.
1970s–late 1980s/1990s (rapprochement and normalization): Driven by shared concerns about the Soviet Union, Nixon’s 1972 visit and the Shanghai Communiqué began the opening. Full diplomatic relations were established in 1979 under Carter (US switched recognition to the PRC while maintaining unofficial ties with Taiwan via the Taiwan Relations Act). Trade, exchanges, and limited cooperation grew.
1990s–mid-2010s (engagement and integration): China joined the WTO (2001). The US pursued engagement, hoping economic growth would lead to political liberalization and a “responsible stakeholder” role. Trade boomed; China became a major manufacturing hub and US creditor. Cooperation occurred on issues like counterterrorism and climate, though frictions over Taiwan, human rights, and trade imbalances existed. Concepts like a potential “G2” were floated.
Mid-2010s–early 2020s (shift to rivalry): China’s military modernization, assertiveness in the South China Sea and toward Taiwan, state-driven industrial policies (Made in China 2025), technology acquisition practices, human rights issues (Xinjiang, Hong Kong), and growing economic/military power led the US to reassess. The first Trump administration (2017–21) labeled China a strategic competitor, launched the trade war with Section 301 tariffs, and tightened tech/export controls. The Biden administration largely continued and expanded this framework of competition (alliances like AUKUS/Quad, further semiconductor restrictions, and “de-risking”). Debates over the origins of COVID-19, the balloon incident, and other events have worsened trust. Decoupling talk rose in sensitive sectors.
2025–2026 (Trump second term recalibration toward managed competition/stability): Early high tariffs and confrontation gave way to personal diplomacy after meetings (including in late 2025). A tariff truce, commercial deals, and the framing of “constructive strategic stability” emerged, prioritizing leader summits, economic pragmatism, and avoiding worst-case outcomes while competition continues in technology and security. This reflects mutual recognition of economic interdependence and the costs of uncontrolled rivalry, alongside both leaders’ domestic priorities. [thinkchina.sg]
The relationship has always mixed commercial attraction with strategic suspicion.
Structural drivers of tension today include power shifts (China’s rise), ideological differences, Taiwan, technology leadership (especially AI/semiconductors), and supply-chain security.
Periods of engagement or détente have typically been driven by shared external threats or mutual economic interests; rivalry intensifies when relative power changes or domestic politics harden positions.
The current phase prioritizes managing competition over resolving core differences.
Here Are the Names
Here is Natalie’s full report on her Substack…
Her report provides the receipts as well as more information not covered in her live streamed report
