SCOTUS 23-108: 6-3 Concurring
Can state and local officials“corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept“ anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded” for an official act?
Facts of the Case
James Snyder formerly served as mayor of Portage, Indiana. He was convicted of federal funds bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) for soliciting and accepting $13,000 in connection with the city’s purchases of garbage trucks, among other federal crimes.
Before, during, and after trial, Snyder argued that the evidence did not support a finding that there was an agreement to exchange money for the truck contracts before they were awarded. Without a prior quid pro quo agreement, he argued, § 666 cannot apply. Interpreting the plain language of the statute and Sixth Circuit precedent, the district court rejected his interpretation of that provision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) criminalize gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions a state or local official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions?
Syllabus
SNYDER v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 23–108. Argued April 15, 2024—Decided June 26, 2024
EXTRACT:
Federal and state law distinguish between two kinds of payments to public officials—bribes and gratuities.
Bribes are typically payments made or agreed to before an official act in order to influence the public official with respect to that future official act.
Gratuities are typically payments made to a public official after an official act as a reward or token of appreciation.
While American law generally treats bribes as inherently corrupt and unlawful, the law’s treatment of gratuities is more nuanced.
Some gratuities might be innocuous, and others may raise ethical and appearance concerns.
Federal, state, and local governments have drawn different lines on which gratuities and gifts are acceptable and which are not.
Opinion of the Court
The Government asks this Court to adopt an interpretation of §666 that would radically upend gratuities rules and turn §666 into a vague and unfair trap for 19 million state and local officials. We decline to do so. Section 666 is a vital statute, but its focus is targeted: Section 666 proscribes bribes to state and local officials, while allowing state and local governments to regulate gratuities to state and local officials. Within constitutional bounds, Congress can always change the law if it wishes to do so. But since 1986, it has not, presumably because Congress understands that state and local governments may and often do regulate gratuities to state and local officials. We reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
VOTE: 6 -3 (Jackson, Sotomayuor, Kagan dissenting)
Oral Arguments (audio and PDF)