Alito's Dissenting Opinion Is On Target

The following is the Dissenting Opinion from JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE GORSUCH, and JUSTICE KAVANAUGH join (just what Associate Justice Amy Coney Barrett was thinking is beyond any reasonable thinking at this desk).

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 24A831

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ET AL. v. AIDS VACCINE

ADVOCACY COALITION, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION TO VACATE THE ORDER ISSUED BY

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[March 5, 2025]

On February 13, the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia entered a temporary restraining order

enjoining the Government from enforcing directives paus-

ing disbursements of foreign development assistance funds.

The present application does not challenge the Govern-

ment’s obligation to follow that order. On February 25, the

District Court ordered the Government to issue payments

for a portion of the paused disbursements—those owed for

work already completed before the issuance of the District

Court’s temporary restraining order—by 11:59 p.m. on Feb-

ruary 26. Several hours before that deadline, the Govern-

ment filed this application to vacate the District Court’s

February 25 order and requested an immediate administra-

tive stay. THE CHIEF J USTICE entered an administrative

stay shortly before the 11:59 p.m. deadline and subse-

quently referred the application to the Court. The applica-

tion is denied. Given that the deadline in the challenged

order has now passed, and in light of the ongoing prelimi-

nary injunction proceedings, the District Court should clar-

ify what obligations the Government must fulfill to ensure

compliance with the temporary restraining order, with due

regard for the feasibility of any compliance timelines. The

order heretofore entered by THE CHIEF JUSTICE is vacated.

JUSTICE ALITO , with whom JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE

GORSUCH , and JUSTICE KAVANAUGH join, dissenting from

the denial of the application to vacate order.

---

Does a single district-court judge who likely lacks juris-

diction have the unchecked power to compel the Govern-

ment of the United States to pay out (and probably lose for-

ever) 2 billion taxpayer dollars? The answer to that

question should be an emphatic “No,” but a majority of this

Court apparently thinks otherwise. I am stunned.

I

In capsule form, this is what happened. Respondents are

a group of American businesses and nonprofits that receive

foreign-assistance funds from the State Department and

the U. S. Agency for International Development. They

brought suit and claimed that the current administration’s

temporary pause of foreign-assistance payments is unlaw-

ful. On February 13, 2025, the District Court issued a tem-

porary restraining order (TRO) requiring the Government

to halt its funding pause. It based that decision on a finding

that respondents are likely to succeed in showing that the

Government violated the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA). After issuing the TRO, the District Judge grew frus-

trated with the pace at which funds were being disbursed,

and on February 25, he issued a second order requiring the

Government to pay out approximately $2 billion. The judge

brushed aside the Government’s argument that sovereign

immunity barred this enforcement order, and he took two

steps that, unless corrected, would prevent any higher court

from reviewing and possibly stopping the payments. First,

he labeled the order as a non-appealable TRO, and second,

he demanded that the money be paid within 36 hours.

This left the Government little time to try to obtain some

review of what it regarded as a lawless order. The Govern-

ment moved for a stay pending appeal in the District Court.

But the judge shrugged off the Government’s sovereign-

immunity argument and ignored the Government’s repre-

sentation that most of the money in question, once dis-

bursed, could probably not be recovered. See App. to Appli-

cation to Vacate Order 93a.

The Government quickly filed an appeal in the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. But,

with only four hours to spare before the payment deadline,

the D. C. Circuit dismissed the Government’s appeal be-

cause it took the District Court’s “TRO” label at face value

and determined it lacked appellate jurisdiction.

With nowhere else to turn and the deadline fast ap-

proaching, the Government asked this Court to intervene.

At the last moment, THE CHIEF J USTICE issued an admin-

istrative stay. Unfortunately, a majority has now undone

that stay. As a result, the Government must apparently

pay the $2 billion posthaste—not because the law requires

it, but simply because a District Judge so ordered. As the

Nation’s highest court, we have a duty to ensure that the

power entrusted to federal judges by the Constitution is not

abused. Today, the Court fails to carry out that responsi-

bility.

II

Time does not allow a lengthy discussion of the legal is-

sues presented by this case, but a brief summary suffices to

show that the District Court’s order should be vacated or,

at the very least, stayed.

To start, it is clear that the District Court’s enforcement

order should be construed as an appealable preliminary in-

junction, not a mere TRO. A TRO, as its name suggests, is

“temporary,” and its proper role is to “restrain” challenged

conduct for a short time while the court considers whether

more lasting relief is warranted. See 16 C. Wright, A. Mil-

ler, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3922.1

(3d ed. 2012). The order here, which commanded the pay-

ment of a vast sum that in all likelihood can never be fully

recovered, is in no sense “temporary.” Nor did the order

merely “restrain” the Government’s challenged action in or-

der to “preserve the status quo.” Northeast Ohio Coalition

for Homeless and Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 1199

v. Blackwell, 467 F. 3d 999, 1006 (CA6 2006). Rather, it

“act[s] as a mandatory injunction requiring affirmative ac-

tion” by the Government. Ibid. And given its likely irre-

versibility, the District Court’s enforcement order effec-

tively gave respondents a portion of the ultimate relief they

seek.

For these reasons, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction

to consider the Government’s appeal, and we have jurisdic-

tion to review and summarily vacate that court’s erroneous

judgment.

III

Even if the majority is unwilling to vacate the District

Court’s order, it should at least stay the District Court’s en-

forcement order until the Government is able to petition for

a writ of certiorari. In considering whether to issue such a

stay, we ask, at a minimum, (1) whether the moving party

is likely to prevail on the merits and (2) whether that mov-

ing party is likely to suffer irreparable harm.* See Nken v.

Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 425 (2009); Grupo Mexicano de De-

sarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U. S. 308,

327 (1999). In “close cases,” we also take into account other

[FOOTNOTE]

*To the extent that likelihood of certiorari is a relevant factor, John

Does 1–3 v. Mills, 595 U. S ___, ___ (2021) (BARRETT , J., concurring in the

denial of application for injunctive relief) (slip op., at 1), it is met here.

Recent years have seen a sharp increase in district-court orders enjoin-

ing important Government initiatives, and some of these have been la-

beled as unappealable TROs. See Dellinger v. Bessent, 2025 WL 559669

(CADC, Feb. 15, 2025); id., at *10–*17 (Katsas, J., dissenting). Clarifi-

cation of the standards for distinguishing between a TRO and a prelimi-

nary injunction is a matter that deserves this Court’s attention at the

present time. The same is true regarding the scope of the APA’s waiver

of sovereign immunity.

equitable considerations. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S.

183, 190 (2010) (per curiam). Here, these factors weigh in

favor of a stay.

Likelihood of success. The Government has shown a like-

lihood of success on the merits of its argument that sover-

eign immunity deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to

enter its enforcement order.

Sovereign immunity bars “a suit by private parties seek-

ing to impose a liability which must be paid from public

funds in the . . . treasury.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.

651, 663 (1974). But that is exactly what the District Court

ordered here. See App. to Application to Vacate Order 85a–

86a (“[T]he restrained defendants shall pay all invoices and

letter of credit drawdown requests on all contracts for work

completed prior to the entry of the Court’s TRO on February

13”).

Sovereign immunity may be waived, but “[t]o sustain a

claim that the Government is liable for awards of monetary

damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity must extend

unambiguously to such monetary claims.” Lane v. Peña,

518 U. S. 187, 192 (1996). Attempting to satisfy this strict

requirement, respondents point to the APA’s waiver of sov-

ereign immunity for certain actions “seeking relief other

than money damages.” 5 U. S. C. §702. That language, as

we have explained, distinguishes “between specific relief,”

which is permitted under the APA, and “compensatory, or

substitute, relief,” which is not. Department of Army v. Blue

Fox, Inc., 525 U. S. 255, 261 (1999). But the relief here more

closely resembles a compensatory money judgment rather

than an order for specific relief that might have been avail-

able in equity. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.

Knudson, 534 U. S. 204, 210–211 (2002) (“[A]n injunction to

compel the payment of money past due under a contract, or

specific performance of a past due monetary obligation, was

not typically available in equity”). Sovereign immunity

thus appears to bar the sort of compensatory relief that the

District Court ordered here.

Hoping to escape that conclusion, respondents point to

Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U. S. 879 (1988). In that case,

we held that the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity cov-

ered a District Court’s judgment reversing a final order of

the Secretary of Health and Human Services refusing to re-

imburse Massachusetts for certain Medicaid expenditures.

Unlike the District Court’s order here, that “judgment did

not purport to . . . order that any payment be made” by the

United States. Id., at 888. Rather, Bowen simply recog-

nized a basic reality of APA review: after a court sets aside

an agency action, a natural consequence may be the release

of funds to the plaintiff down the road. Indeed, we have

since clarified that “Bowen has no bearing on the unavaila-

bility of an injunction to enforce a contractual obligation to

pay money past due”—the sort of relief that appears to have

been ordered here. Knudson, 534 U. S., at 212.

The District Court, however, failed to mention (much less

reckon with) Bowen or Knudson before plowing ahead with

its $2 billion order. Nor did it take account of our previous

suggestion that the proper remedy for an agency’s recalci-

trant failure to pay out may be to “seek specific sums al-

ready calculated” and “past due” in the Court of Federal

Claims. Maine Community Health Options v. United

States, 590 U. S. 296, 327 (2020); Bowen, 487 U. S., at 890,

n. 13 (invoking the First Circuit’s suggestion that if an

agency “ ‘persist[s] in withholding reimbursement for rea-

sons inconsistent with our decision’ ” under the APA, the

“ ‘remedy would be a suit for money past due under the

Tucker Act in the Claims Court’ ”). The most that can be

said is that in the District Court’s denial of the Govern-

ment’s motion for a stay pending appeal, it cited but did not

analyze a handful of cases echoing Bowen’s discussion of the

APA’s conscribed waiver of sovereign immunity. One might

expect more care from a federal court before it so blithely

discards “sovereign dignity.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706,

715 (1999).

Finally, the Government has a strong argument that the

District Court’s order violates the principle that a federal

court may not issue an equitable remedy that is “more bur-

densome to the defendant than necessary to” redress the

plaintiff ’s injuries. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682,

702 (1979). In this case, the District Court’s enforcement

order functions as a “universal injunction def[ying] these

foundational” limits on equitable jurisdiction. Labrador v.

Poe, 601 U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (GORSUCH , J., concurring in

grant of stay) (slip op., at 5). The District Court ordered the

Government to “pay all invoices and letter of credit draw-

down requests on all contracts” for pre-TRO work com-

pleted. App. to Application to Vacate Order 86a. That order

encompasses more than just respondents, and the District

Court offered no reason why universal relief to nonparties

is appropriate here. And this is not the sort of case in which

only universal relief is feasible. Even supposing the APA

allows universal vacatur of rules in some circumstances,

the District Court’s order of direct monetary payment bears

no resemblance to that. Cf. Griffin v. HM Florida-Orl, LLC,

601 U. S. ___, ___, n. 1 (2023) (KAVANAUGH, J., respecting

denial of application for stay) (slip op., at 3, n. 1.). And no-

body has suggested that the Government is unable to iden-

tify respondents’ allegedly owed funds and pay out only to

them. Limiting the scope of relief in that manner would be

significant. Below, the Government represented respond-

ents seek roughly $250 million—still a large figure, but a

fraction of the $2 billion ordered. Emergency Motion for

Immediate Administrative Stay and for Stay Pending Ap-

peal in No. 25-5046 etc. (CADC), p. 9.

Harm to the parties and others. The Government has

shown that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm if the Dis-

trict Court’s order is not stayed. The Government has rep-

resented that it would probably be unable to recover much

of the money after it is paid because it would be quickly

spent by the recipients or disbursed to third parties. Re-

spondents did not credibly dispute this representation, and

the District Court did not find that it is incorrect.

We usually “balance the equities and weigh the relative

harms” in “close cases.” Hollingsworth, 558 U. S., at 190.

For the reasons I have explained, this is not such a case,

and our analysis could end there. Nevertheless, respond-

ents’ equitable arguments are insufficient to justify the de-

nial of a stay. They contend that the failure to pay the

money in question would cause them irreparable harm be-

cause without those funds, they could not continue to oper-

ate or would have to reduce the work they do. As a result,

they claim, recipients of their services would suffer. These

potential consequences are, of course, serious. But any

harm resulting from the failure to pay amounts that the law

requires would have been diminished, if not eliminated, if

the Court of Appeals had promptly decided the merits of the

Government’s appeal, which it should not have dismissed.

If we sent this case back to the Court of Appeals, it could

still render a prompt decision. If it decided in favor of re-

spondents, the Government would be obligated to pay all

the money that is due, and respondents would have suffered

only a short delay in the receipt of payments. And if the

Government prevailed on its sovereign-immunity argu-

ment, neither respondents nor any of the recipients of their

services would have suffered any unlawful consequences.

In sum, the factors we consider in deciding whether to

issue a stay weigh strongly in favor of granting that relief.

* * *

Today, the Court makes a most unfortunate misstep that

rewards an act of judicial hubris and imposes a $2 billion

penalty on American taxpayers. The District Court has

made plain its frustration with the Government, and re-

spondents raise serious concerns about nonpayment for

completed work. But the relief ordered is, quite simply, too

extreme a response. A federal court has many tools to ad-

dress a party’s supposed nonfeasance. Self-aggrandize-

ment of its jurisdiction is not one of them. I would chart a

different path than the Court does today, so I must respect-

fully dissent.

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